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In April 2012, the Supreme Court ofCanada released its decision in
what has become the pivotal case on personal jurisdiction in Canada,
Van Breda v. Club Resorts Ltd.' In Van Breda, the Court laid out a
new framework for, and defined more precisely the content of, the
"real and substantial connection" test that governs the assertion of
jurisdiction over ex juris defendants. Specifically, the Court created
four presumptive connecting factors that courts are to use in
jurisdictional determinations. The presumptive connecting factors
approach to jurisdiction was intended to increase certainty and
predictability in jurisdictional determinations.
One issue that was alluded to, but ultimately left unanswered, by
the Supreme Court in Van Breda was what effect the new presumptive
factors framework for the real and substantial connection test had on
the enforcement of judgments. Since the Supreme Court's seminal
decision in Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye2 in 1990, it is well-
established law that the real and substantial connection test for
jurisdiction simpliciter is intended to be "correlated" 3 with the real
and substantial connection test used as a predicate for enforcing
foreign judgments. Does this mean that courts are now supposed to
use the new Van Breda framework for jurisdiction simpliciter in the
judgment enforcement context? Some commentators believe so. For
instance, Professor Blom argues:4
* Associate Professor, Roger Williams University School of Law, Bristol,
Rhode Island. The author would like to thank Nicole Manzo for her very
helpful research assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. 2012 SCC 17, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 572, 343 D.L.R. (4th) 577 (S.C.C.) (" Van
Breda").
2. [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077, 76 D.L.R. (4th) 256, 46 C.P.C. (2d) I (S.C.C.)
("Morguard").
3. Ibid. at 1103. ("the taking of jurisdiction by a court in one province and its
recognition in another must be viewed as correlative")
4. Joost Blom, "New Ground Rules for Jurisdictional Disputes: The Van Breda
Quartet" (2012), 53 C.B.L.J. I at 29.
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A broader question is whether the new approach to jurisdiction simpliciter [from
Van Breda] will work its way into the recognition of foreign judgments ... After
Van Breda, if the issue is the jurisdiction of a Canadian court, the judge must use
presumptive connecting factors. There is much to be said for employing a similar
method to assess the jurisdiction of foreign courts when called on to enforce
undefended foreign judgments. Predictability is equally desirable in that area.
This article argues the opposite: that the real and substantial
connection framework established by the Court in Van Breda for
jurisdiction simpliciter should not be exported outside of the
particular context in which it was developed. The Van Breda
approach to jurisdiction simpliciter, although seemingly
straightforward, is actually a blunt tool for assessing jurisdiction -
and any concerns with its application would only be magnified if
applied to the enforcement of foreign judgments.
This article proceeds as follows: in Part 2, 1 discuss the background
of the real and substantial connection test in both the jurisdiction
simpliciter and judgment enforcement context. I then discuss in Part 3
how courts in Canada have approached the real and substantial
connection test for judgment enforcement in the 20 plus years since
the Supreme Court of Canada's landmark decision in Morguard.
Next, in Part 4, 1 advance the argument that courts should not use the
Van Breda version of the real and substantial connection test in
assessing jurisdiction for judgment enforcement purposes. I argue
that Justice LeBel's discussion of the two faces of the real and
substantial connection test clarifies that what is intended to be
jurisdictionally "correlated" is the constitutional dimension of the
real and substantial connection test, not the common law/conflict of
laws dimension of the real and substantial connection test. I further
argue that the Van Breda test is unduly complicated and uncertain
when applied to its original context -jurisdiction simpliciter - and
that its complexity would only be magnified when applied to the
enforcement of foreign judgments. Finally, I discuss the need for
certainty and predictability in jurisdictional determinations and
argue that this need is less compelling forjudgment enforcement than
it is forjurisdiction simpliciter. In Part 5, 1 address the argument that
the application of a real and substantial connection test based on
objective connections in the judgment enforcement analysis means
that foreign plaintiffs (seekingjudgment enforcement) will fare better
than Canadian plaintiffs (seeking to sue in Canada). I respond to this
critique by distinguishing between the inter-provincial and the
international context and arguing that the latter would benefit from
wholesale revision in a way that reflects fundamental policy choices
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about the circumstances in which foreign judgments are to be
enforced. In Part 6, 1 offer some concluding remarks.
2. The Real and Substantial Connection Test and the
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
The modern law ofjudgment enforcement in Canada can be traced
to the Supreme Court's decision in MorguardInvestments Ltd. v. De
Savoye.5 Prior to Morguard, the Canadian rules for the enforcement
of foreign judgments paralleled those of England. In particular, a
foreign court would only be regarded as jurisdictionally competent
for enforcement purposes if the defendant was served in the foreign
jurisdiction or if the defendant consented to personal jurisdiction in
the foreign court.6 Thus, only "presence" and "consent" were
regarded as legitimate bases ofjudicial jurisdiction for the purposes of
enforcing a foreign judgment. If the foreign court assumed
jurisdiction on a basis other than presence or consent (say, on the
basis that a tort was committed in thejurisdiction or a contract was to
be performed in the jurisdiction), the foreign court would not be
regarded as jurisdictionally competent when it came to a Canadian
court enforcing its judgment.7
The Supreme Court in Morguard, however, acknowledged that the
English rules were outmoded and ill-suited to the realities of a modern
Canadian federation. Morguard involved an action in British
Columbia to enforce a default judgment rendered by an Alberta
court in respect of a mortgage deficiency proceeding in Alberta. There
was no doubt that the dispute had a significant connection to Alberta
and that the Alberta court had properly assumed jurisdiction (the
land in question was in Alberta and the mortgage was taken out in
Alberta). However, under thejudgment enforcement rules prevailing
5. Supra note 2.
6. Establishing that the foreign court had jurisdiction over the dispute under
Canadian standards of jurisdiction is only one of several prerequisites to
enforcing a foreign judgment. Other prerequisites include establishing that
the judgment is final and that the judgment would not amount to the
enforcement of a foreign public law. Additionally, the defendant resisting
enforcement of the judgment may raise various impeachment defences, such
as fraud, natural justice, or public policy, to argue that the judgment should
not be enforced. Thus, the real and substantial connection test as a
jurisdictional prerequisite is only part of the enforcement picture.
7. Importantly, under Canadian law (both then and now), a judgment from a
sister province is considered "foreign" in the same way as a judgment from
another country. Thus, the law related to the enforcement of "foreign
judgments" applies equally to the judgments of sister provinces and foreign
countries.
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at the time, the judgment was not enforceable in British Columbia,
where the defendant had since moved, because the defendant had not
been served with process in Alberta, nor had it consented to the
jurisdiction of the Alberta courts. The Supreme Court saw this result
as illogical- if Alberta was an appropriate forum for the resolution of
the dispute (indeed, the most appropriate forum), why should a
judgment rendered by an Alberta court not be enforceable in other
Canadian provinces? The Supreme Court agreed. It held that that so
long as the judgment forum had a "real and substantial connection"
with the dispute, the judgment should be readily enforceable across
provincial lines. Accordingly, the Supreme Court added "real and
substantial connection" to the list of appropriate jurisdictional bases
for enforcement.
Morguard, however, left some unanswered questions in its wake.
In particular, it was unclear whether the framework for enforcement
jurisdiction applied merely to out-of-province defendants (i.e.,
defendants from other provinces in Canada), or also applied to
out-of-country defendants. The question was answered in Beals v.
Saldanha, a case involving the enforcement in Ontario of a sizeable
Florida judgment. In Beals, the Supreme Court asked for specific
submissions from the parties on the issue of whether the real and
substantial connection test developed in Morguard applied to "truly
foreign" judgments - i.e., judgments from outside of Canada.
Ultimately, the Court in Beals held that the real and substantial
connection test articulated in Morguard did indeed apply equally to
out-of-country defendants, noting that "[w]hile there are compelling
reasons to expand the [real and substantial connection] test's
application, there does not appear to be any principled reason not
to do so." 9
Thus, thejudgment enforcement inquiry appeared to be seemingly
straightforward. Prior to enforcing a foreign judgment (including, of
course, judgments from sister provinces), a provincial court needed to
be satisfied that either: a) the defendant was served with process in the
foreign jurisdiction ("presence"); b) the defendant consented to the
jurisdiction of the foreign court, either through express agreement or
attornment ("consent"); or c) there was some meaningful connection
between the foreign forum and the action ("real and substantial
connection"). Even though the real and substantial connection test
originated in the judgment enforcement context, it also became the
touchstone for jurisdiction over ex juris defendants in general. In
other words, the real and substantial connection test that was
8. 2003 SCC 72, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 416, 234 D.L.R. (4th) 1 (S.C.C.) ("Beals").
9. Ibid. at para. 19.
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developed to expand the potential grounds of jurisdiction for
enforcement purposes soon became the litmus test for "regular"
jurisdictional analysis as well. The complementarity of the
jurisdictional test was telegraphed in Morguard itself when Justice
La Forest stated that "the taking of jurisdiction by a court in one
province and its recognition in another must be viewed as
correlatives."'o
Given the correlative nature of the jurisdictional test (i.e., the idea
thatjudicial jurisdiction is the same on the "front end" as on the "back
end"), it became increasingly important for courts to be mindful of
how developments in the law of jurisdiction on the front end would
impact the law of jurisdiction on the back end and vice versa.
Unfortunately, courts have not always consistently or coherently
treated the real and substantial connection test and, over the years,
disparate strands of case law on the real and substantial connection
test seemed to develop depending on whether one was dealing with
jurisdiction simpliciter (the front end) orjurisdiction for enforcement
purposes (the back end).
Most of the attention in the 23 years since Morguard was decided
has been focused on the real and substantial connection test in the
context of ex ante (or front end) jurisdictional determinations.
Accordingly, we have witnessed key decisions such as the Ontario
Court of Appeal's decisions in Muscuit v. Courcelles' in 2002 and
Van Breda v. Village Resorts Ltd.12 in 2010 which sought to define
more precisely the content of the real and substantial connection test
as applied to ex.juris defendants.' 3 Very little attention has been spent
10. Supra note 2 at I 103.
I1. (2002), 213 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 13 C.C.L.T. (3d) 161, 26 C.P.C. (5th) 206 (Ont.
C.A.), additional reasons (2002), 213 D.L.R. (4th) 661, 13 C.C.L.T. (3d) 238,
26 C.P.C. (5th) 203 (Ont. C.A.) ("Muscult"). Muscull was decided with four
companion cases. See Leulkens v. A/ba Tours International Inc. (2002), 213
D.L.R. (4th) 614, 13 C.C.L.T. (3d) 217, 26 C.P.C. (5th) 247 (Ont. C.A.),
additional reasons (2002), 213 D.L.R. (4th) 661, 13 C.C.L.T. (3d) 238, 26
C.P.C. (5th) 203 (Ont. C.A.); Lenunex v. Bernard (2002), 213 D.L.R. (4th)
627, 13 C.C.L.T. (3d) 203, 26 C.P.C. (5th) 259 (Ont. C.A.), additional
reasons (2002), 213 D.L.R. (4th) 661, 13 C.C.L.T. (3d) 238, 26 C.P.C. (5th)
203 (Ont. C.A.); Sinclair v. Cracker Barrel Old Countriy Store Inc. (2002), 213
D.L.R. (4th) 643, 13 C.C.L.T. (3d) 230, 26 C.P.C. (5th) 239 (Ont. C.A.),
additional reasons (2002), 213 D.L.R. (4th) 661, 13 C.C.L.T. (3d) 238, 26
C.P.C. (5th) 203 (Ont. C.A.); and Gajraj v. DeBernardo (2002), 213 D.L.R.
(4th) 651, 13 C.C.L.T. (3d) 194, 24 C.P.C. (5th) 258 (Ont. C.A.), additional
reasons (2002), 213 D.L.R. (4th) 661, 13 C.C.L.T. (3d) 238, 26 C.P.C. (5th)
203 (Ont. C.A.).
12. 2010 ONCA 84, (2010), 316 D.L.R. (4th) 201, 71 C.C.L.T. (3d) 161 (Ont.
C.A.) (" Van Breda Court of Appeal Decision").
13. Each of these decisions is discussed in more detail, infra at Part 3.
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on defining or conceptualizing the real and substantial connection
test forjudgment enforcement purposes (the back end). Accordingly,
it was not - and is still not - entirely clear whether the principles
developed in the jurisdiction simpliciter context apply equally to the
enforcement context.
In early 2012, the Supreme Court released its decision in Van Breda
v. Club Resorts Ltd., where the Court adopted an entirely new
framework for the assertion of personal jurisdiction over out-of-
province defendants. Responding to continued critiques that the real
and substantial connection test was too nebulous and uncertain in
application to guidejurisdictional determinations, the Court decided
to more precisely define the concept of a real and substantial
connection as applied to ex.juris defendants. It stressed that the real
and substantial connection test should focus on objective factual
connections between the forum and the dispute, and not amorphous
concepts like fairness, efficiency or comity. The Court held that in
order to establish jurisdiction, a plaintiff must fit himself within one
of the following four presumptive connecting factors:' 4
(a) the defendant is domiciled or resident in the province;
(b) the defendant carries on business in the province;
(c) the tort was committed in the province;
(d) a contract connected with the dispute was made in the province.
The Court noted, however, that this list of presumptive connecting
factors is not closed and that "[o]ver time, courts may identify new
factors which also presumptively entitle a court to assume
jurisdiction."' 5 In formulating new connecting factors, the
Supreme Court urged that courts look for connections that give
rise to relationships that are similar to the four presumptive
connecting factors. Potential relevant considerations include:'
(a) Similarity of the connecting factor with the recognized presumptive
connecting factors;
(b) Treatment of the connecting factor in the case law;
(c) Treatment of the connecting factor in statute law; and
(d) Treatment of the connecting factor in the private international law of
other legal systems with a shared commitment to order, fairness and
comity.
Importantly, where no presumptive factor (whether listed or new)
applies, a court should not assume jurisdiction. Specifically, "a court
should not assumejurisdiction on the basis of the combined effect of a
14. Van Breda, supra note I at para. 90.
15. Ibid. at para. 91.
16. Ibid.
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number of non-presumptive connecting factors." The Court was
concerned that this would open the door to case-by-case
determinations of jurisdiction, which would undermine the order
and predictability that the new test was designed to promote.
Courts have begun the difficult Process of wading through various
aspects of the Van Breda decision. One issue that will soon surface is
what the Van Breda decision means, if anything, for the enforcement
of foreign judgments. Must the real and substantial connection test
for judgment enforcement purposes parallel that established in Van
Breda for jurisdiction simpliciter? Should it?
Justice LeBel expressly recognized that the Van Breda decision
could have broader implications for judgment enforcement and
choice of law. In Justice LeBel's words:
17. Ibid. at para. 93.
18. For instance, in Trillium Motor World Ltd. v. General Motors of Canada
Ltd., 2013 ONSC 2289, 228 A.C.W.S. (3d) 971, 2013 CarswellOnt 6666 (Ont.
S.C.J.), Justice Belobaba was required to sort out what the Van Breda
presumptive factor "a contract connected with the dispute was made in the
province" meant in the context of a class action dispute related to the
termination of certain General Motors franchisc agreements. Justice
Belobaba expressed concern with the lack of clarity associated with this
presumptive connecting factor:
The Supreme Court made clear in Van Breda that a court can assume
jurisdiction in tort cases if "a contract connected with the dispute was
made in the province." What the Court did not make clear is what this
means.
Consider the following scenario: Jim, who lives in Ontario, and Fred, who
lives in B.C. are vacationing at a resort in Cuba. They meet in the hotel
bar and begin a heated discussion about a recent hockey trade between the
Toronto Maple Leafs and the Ottawa Senators. The discussion
degenerates into a fist fight. Jim is badly beaten. After recovering from
his injuries and returning to his home in Ontario, he sues Fred in tort for
damages. Can the Ontario court assume jurisdiction because "a contract
connected with the dispute [i.e. the hockey trade agreement] was made in
the province?"
Of course not.
Just because the bar fight in Cuba was caused by a disagreement about a
sports contract made in Ontario does not mean that an Ontario court is
entitled to assume jurisdiction over the dispute. More is needed. But what
and how much?
The question is made all the more difficult because the Court in Van Breda
did not really explain how it came up with this fourth presumptive
connecting factor. All it said was that "[cilaims related to contracts made
in Ontario would also be properly brought in the Ontario courts (rule
17.02(f)(i))."
Ibid. at paras. 1-5 [internal citations omitted].
19. Van Breda, supra note I at para. 16.
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Three categories of issues - jurisdiction, forum non conveniens and the
recognition of foreign judgments - are intertwined in this branch of the law.
Thus, the framework established for the purpose of determining whether a court
has jurisdiction may have an impact on the choice of law and on the recognition
of judgments, and vice versa. Judicial decisions on choice of law and the
recognition of judgments have played a central role in the evolution of the rules
related to jurisdiction. None of the divisions of private international law can be
safely analysed and applied in isolation from the others. [Emphasis added.]
Thus, it appears that the Supreme Court itself potentially sees its
judgment in Van Breda having implications beyond its immediate
context-and in particular, in the areas ofjudgment enforcement and
choice of law.
Academic commentators make similar observations. For instance,
Professor Black maintains that:20
... the impact of Club Resorts [will not] be restricted to the law of judicial
jurisdiction. As noted above, the R&SC [real and substantial connection test] has
come to function in a number of areas, including providing the jurisdictional
standard for determining the enforceability of foreign judgments. This is because
Morguard said that direct and indirect jurisdiction should correlate. This means
that the holding and methodology set out in Club Resorts will have an effect on
cross-border enforcement in Canada, both interprovincially and internationally.
Similarly, Professor Blom notes that "[a] broader question is whether
the new approach to jurisdiction sini liciter will work its way into the
recognition of foreign judgments." 1 1 have also previously noted
that "[a] question raised by Van Breda is what the decision means for
cases involving the enforcement of foreign judgments." 22
20. Vaughan Black, "Simplifying Court Jurisdiction in Canada" (2012), 8:3 J. P.
Int'l L. 411 at 439-40.
21. Blom, op. cit. note 4 at 29.
22. See Tanya Monestier, "(Still) A 'Real and Substantial' Mess" (2013), 36
Fordham Int'l L.J. 396 at 456. In that piece, I made several preliminary
observations that are expounded on, and clarified, in this article. For
instance, I commented that "Van Breda should be fairly straightforward to
apply in enforcing a foreign tort judgment." Ibid. at 458. While this may be
true in run-of-the mill tort cases where the situs of the tort can easily be
identified, the statement does not account for the myriad of causes of action
that may be brought in the foreign court. Nor does it account for the
complexity in categorizing a case in some instances. All these issues are
discussed in more detail, infra at Part 4. Further, in "(Still) A 'Real and
Substantial' Mess," I was leaning towards the view that courts should apply
the same real and substantial connection test both on the front and back end
and I stated that "it appears odd to have two strands of case law for the same
correlated jurisdictional test." Ibid. at 459. While it may be confusing or, in
my previous words "odd," to have disparate strands of case law for
jurisdiction simpliciter and jurisdiction for enforcement purposes, I have
[Vol. 42
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To date, there have been only a handful of judgment enforcement
decisions post- Van Breda. Most of these involved scenarios easily
resolved on the basis of the traditional grounds of jurisdiction:
presence and consent. 23 The only case to directly discuss the
applicability of the Van Breda framework for jurisdiction to the
enforcement context is the Ontario Court of Appeal's decision in
Sincies Chiementin S.p.A. v. King.24 In King, the Ontario Court of
Appeal seemed to accept, without question, that the Van Breda
presumptive connecting factors approach for assessing jurisdiction
applied to the enforcement of foreign judgments. The Ontario court
in King was called upon to enforce a judgment for over $600,000
issued by an Italian court. The court noted that "[i]n Van Breda, Lebel
J. fashioned a list of four specific connecting factors that lead to a
presumption that a court has jurisdiction. The third factor is that a
tort was committed in the court's territorial jurisdiction." 25 The
Ontario Court of Appeal eventually concluded that "[o]nce it is
determined that a tort has been committed in the foreign jurisdiction,
it brings the case within the third connecting factor from Van Breda,
come to believe, for the reasons discussed herein, that it is doctrinally
preferable to refrain from importing Van Breda into the judgment enforce-
ment framework.
23. For instance, in Blizzard Entertainment Inc. v. Simpson 2012 ONSC 4312,
221 A.C.W.S. (3d) 81, 2012 CarswellOnt 9944 (Ont. S.C.J.), at para. 9,
jurisdiction was established on the basis of the defendant's "consent," a basis
that the Supreme Court in Van Breda affirmed as having continued
jurisdictional legitimacy. See Van Breda, supra note I at para. 79.
24. 2012 ONCA 653, 221 A.C.W.S. (3d) 553, 2012 CarswellOnt 12074 (Ont.
C.A.), leave to appeal refused 2013 CarswellOnt 3405, 2013 CarswellOnt
3404 (S.C.C.) ("King"). In a recent case, Amtim Capital Inc. v'. Appliance
Recycling Centers of America, 2013 ONSC 4867, 116 O.R. (3d) 379, 2013
CarswellOnt 10150 (Ont. S.C.J.), the Ontario Superior Court of Justice was
asked to enforce a declaratory judgment from Minnesota. In assessing
whether Minnesota had a real and substantial connection with the dispute so
as to ground jurisdiction for enforcement purposes, the court made no
mention of the Van Breda framework. Instead, the court applied a
traditional fact-based approach to the real and substantial connection test,
stating:
Amtim has never had any genuine contact with the State of Minnesota,
has never conducted any form of business in that state. All the of services
where compensation is sought were provided in Ontario and elsewhere in
Canada and the agreements between the parties especially provide that
they are not only to be governed by Ontario law but are also to be
"enforced" by Ontario law.
Ibid. at para. 36. Aitim cited Beals as being the operative test for the real
and substantial connection test in the judgment enforcement setting. Ibid. at
para. 29.
25. King, supra note 24 at para. 8.
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and a real and substantial connection is presumptively
established."26 Oddly, however, the Ontario Court of Appeal
deferred to the Italian court on whether a tort had been committed
in Italy, stating:27
In this case, the Civil Court of Rome carefully considered, on its own accord
because King did not attorn to the jurisdiction, the question of whether a tort had
been committed in Italy. The court concluded that, with regard to "extra-
contractual action" (i.e. the tort claim), the tort was committed, and damage
resulted, in Italy.
In our view, a Canadian court should be very cautious in its scrutiny of the
decision of a foreign court in determining whether a tort has been committed in
its jurisdiction. In short, the Civil Court of Rome is better placed than us to
determine its own laws.
It is black-letter law that in considering whether the foreign court
was jurisdictionally competent for enforcement purposes, Canadian
courts are to apply Canadian standards of jurisdiction - to include a
Canadian determination of whether a tort was committed in the
foreign jurisdiction. It does not matter whether an Italian court
believed, under Italian law, that a tort was committed in Italy. The
deference given to the Italian court on this matter was plainly wrong
as a matter of law. In practice, however, it is likely that the result
would have been the same even if the Ontario court had applied a
Canadian analysis of where the tort was committed.
For our purposes, though, the crucial point is that the Ontario
Court of Appeal endorsed the Van Breda framework in thejudgment
28enforcement context (albeit applying it in an incorrect manner).
26. Ibid. at para. I.
27. Ibid. at paras. 9-10.
28. The court also proceeded to discuss issues that were unnecessary to the
analysis:
Here, the motion judge properly concluded that since there was a real and
substantial connection between the subject matter of the action and the
Italian court, the Italian judgment should be recognized and enforced in
Ontario. Under Beals, at paras. 28-29, the principles of comity and
reciprocity inform a Canadian judge's determination of whether a foreign
judgment should be enforced. The motion judge, at para. 189, was keenly
aware of this:
Were the situation reversed, so that Sincies was a Canadian
corporation with head offices in Ontario and all of the other facts
discussed applying, and King as an Italian lawyer who assumed the
same role he had in fact assumed in our case, I have no doubt that an
Ontario court would have readily assumed jurisdiction . . . I see no
reason why principles of comity and reciprocity should not be
recognized in the circumstances of this particular case and foreign
judgment.
2013] Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments 117
Was the court correct to do so? Are there any good reasons for not
applying the Van Breda framework for jurisdiction to the
enforcement of foreign judgments? This article suggests that there
are and that courts should not apply the Van Breda real and
substantial connection test in the judgment enforcement context.
3. Post-Morguard Case Law on the Real and Substantial
Connection Test for Judgment Enforcement Purposes
Prior to examining what the Van Breda decision means for
judgment enforcement, however, it is important to have a sense of
how courts have been treating the real and substantial connection
inquiry in the specific context of judgment enforcement in the post-
Morguard era. Accordingly, I briefly examine the treatment of the
judgment enforcement case law related to the real and substantial
connection test between the time of Morguard through to the present
day.
In the 1990s, courts applied the same real and substantial
connection test to the issue of jurisdiction and the enforcement of
judgments. This real and substantial connection test focused on
objective connections between the judgment forum and the cause of
action. 2 9 During this time period, there were many open questions
Further, the motion judge was cognizant of the principles of order and
fairness that underlie the modern concept of private international law, and
concluded, at para. 186:
It is not unfair that a professional who operates on a worldwide basis
should be subject to foreign jurisdictions. [King] voluntarily entered
into a solicitor/client relationship with a company he knew to be
based in Italy, to whom he expected to give advice and from which he
knew he would receive instructions, whatever dealings and transac-
tions might occur as a result and wherever they might occur.
We agree with this analysis. The appellant knew that his advice would be
received and acted on in Italy, as the evidence indicates it was. He is a
sophisticated party who should have expected to be called to account in
Italy.
Ibid. at paras. 12-13 [internal citations omitted]. It is unclear what the
additional foray into fairness and comity added to the jurisdictional analysis.
Indeed, the Court in Van Breda emphasized that these were not freestanding
considerations, but rather that comity is satisfied, and fairness results,
through a system of rules which is certain and predictable.
29. For instance, in Moses v. Shore Boat Builders Ltd., [19921 5 W.W.R. 282, 68
B.C.L.R. (2d) 394, 1992 CarswellBC 187 (B.C. S.C.), affirmed (1993), 106
D.L.R. (4th) 654, 19 C.P.C. (3d) 219. [1994] I W.W.R. 112 (B.C. C.A.), leave
to appeal refused (1994), 109 D.L.R. (4th) vii (note), 23 C.P.C. (3d) 294
(note), [1994] 2 W.W.R. lxv (note) (S.C.C.), the trial court concluded that
there was a sufficient connection between the foreign forum (Alaska) and the
118 The Advocates'Quarterly [Vol. 42
concerningjurisdiction: Does the real and substantial connection test
require a connection to the defendant or simply to the cause of action?
Does the real and substantial connection test apply only to the
enforcement of interprovincial judgments or does it extend to
international judgments? What is the role of the service ex juris
categories in relation to the real and substantial connection test?
These questions would ultimately come to be answered in subsequent
case law. However, it is clear that in this era the approach to, and
content of, the real and substantial connection test was the same at
both thej urisdiction simpliciter stage of the analysis and thejudgment
enforcement stage of the analysis.
In the 2002 case of Muscuit v. Courcelles,30 the Ontario Court of
Appeal sought to give more substance to the amorphous real and
substantial connection test by enumerating several factors that a
court should consider in determining whether it had jurisdiction
simpliciter over an out-of-province defendant. This list of non-
exhaustive factors (the "Muscutt factors") included:3 1
1) the connection between the forum and the plaintiff's claim;
2) the connection between the forum and the defendant;
3) unfairness to the defendant in assuming jurisdiction;
4) unfairness to the plaintiff in not assuming jurisdiction;
5) the involvement of other parties to the suit;
6) the court's willingness to recognize and enforce an extra-provincial
judgment rendered on the same jurisdictional basis;
7) whether the case is interprovincial or international in nature; and
8) comity and standards of jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement
prevailing elsewhere.
For the next decade, courts in Ontario (and indeed, throughout
much of Canada) applied the Muscutt factors in making the
action to ground jurisdiction for enforcement purposes. The trial court
articulated those connections as follows:
Mr. Moses chose to sue in Alaska, where the boat was being used, where
the damage was suffered, where the boat was repaired, where he had
signed the contract for its construction, where he lived when he signed the
contract, and where the boat's purchase was financed. These are
significant contacts with Alaska. Indeed, I think they are sufficient to
constitute the connection required by the Morguard test.
They are sufficiently real and substantial because they establish the kind of
connection between Alaska and the contract for the construction of the
boat that makes it fair for the defendant to be required to defend the
action in the courts of Alaska.
Ibid. at paras. 16-17. The British Columbia Court of Appeal agreed that the
connections were sufficiently real and substantial to ground jurisdiction.
30. Muscutt, supra note 11.
31. Ibid. at paras. 76-110.
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determination of whether a real and substantial connection between
the forum and the cause of action existed so as to ground jurisdiction
simpliciter. In the enforcement context, however, the Muscutt factors
were largely ignored, with courts preferring instead to focus simply
on objective connections between the foreign court and the cause of
action in order to ground jurisdiction.32
There were a few cases on the margins, however, that did seem to
accept the applicability of the Muscutt framework in the judgment
enforcement analysis. For instance, in More & More AG v. P.Y.A.
Importer Ltd.,33 the court appeared to apply - albeit loosely - the
Muscutt factors in concluding that there was a real and substantial
connection between the dispute and thejudgment forum. The court in
More noted that "[tlhe applicant argued persuasively here that a real
and substantial connection does exist to the province of Ontario. In
this case, four of the Muscuit factors are engaged."34 Although the
court did not explain which of the Muscutt factors were engaged, or
how, it seemed to accept that the Muscult framework, including
fairness, was a part of the jurisdictional inquiry for judgment
enforcement purposes.
By the late 2000s, criticisms of the Muscutt approach to
jurisdiction had begun to emerge.3 5 Accordingly, the Ontario
32. See, e.g., Disney Enterprises Inc. v. Click Enterprises Inc. (2006), 267 D.L.R.
(4th) 291, 49 C.P.R. (4th) 87, 2006 CarswellOnt 2045 (Ont. S.C.J.); Mill
Valley Bamboo Associates, LLC v. D.T.I. Diversified Transportation Inc.,
2006 CarswellOnt 7424 (Ont. S.C.J.); Skippings Rutley v. Darragh, 2008
BCSC 159, 2008 CarswellBC 332 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]).
33. 2010 ONSC 2250, 2010 CarswellOnt 2474 (Ont. S.C.J.), affirmed 2010
ONCA 771, 2010 CarswellOnt 8621 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused
(2011), 287 O.A.C. 398 (note), 422 N.R. 400 (note), 2011 CarswellOnt 2974
(S.C.C.).
34. Ibid. at para. 8.
35. The Ontario Court of Appeal in Van Breda summarized these at para. 56 as
follows:
1) the Muscutt test is too subjective and confers too much discretion on
motion judges;
2) the eight-part test is too complicated and too flexible and therefore
leads to inconsistent application;
3) there is too much overlap of the test for jurisdiction with the test for
forum conveniens;
4) a clearer, more black-letter test should be applied to foster international
trade and to avoid the cost and delay of preliminary skirmishing over
jurisdiction;
5) the Muscutt test allows ill-defined fairness considerations to trump
order in an area of the law where order should prevail;
6) the Muscutt framework, and especially the fairness factor, is susceptible
to forum shopping, threatening to cause an influx of litigants to Ontario;
7) lack of predictability and certainty increases litigation costs and
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36Court of Appeal in Van Breda v. Club Resorts Ltd. revamped the
approach to jurisdiction simpliciler by creating a "category-based
presumption" of a real and substantial connection where the case fell
under any of the subsections of Rule 17.02 of the Ontario Rules of
Civil Procedure, with the exception of Rule 17.02(h) ("damages
sustained in Ontario") and Rule 17.02(o) ("necessary or proper
party").37 Under the Court of Appeal's approach in Van Breda, the
presumption would not preclude a plaintiff from establishing the
existence of a real and substantial connection in circumstances not
covered by the rules; nor would the presumption preclude a
defendant from demonstrating that the real and substantial
connection test was not satisfied, even though the case fell within
one of the enumerated grounds for service exjuris. Moreover, the real
and substantial connection test was re-focused such that it was
concerned with objective connections between the forum and the
parties (what were previously Muscutt factors 1-2). The remaining
Muscutt factors (factors 3-8) would still remain relevant as so-called
"analytic tools" which would serve to assist the court in assessing the
significance of the connections between the forum, the claim and the
defendant.
In the two or so years that elapsed between the release of the Court
of Appeal's decision in Van Breda and the Supreme Court's decision
in Van Breda, several judgment enforcement actions were brought
where the real and substantial connection test was implicated. Again,
the vast majority of courts failed to apply the Ontario Court of
Appeal's decision in Van Breda to the issue of jurisdiction for
enforcement purposes but rather simply analyzed the facts before
them to conclude that there was a real and substantial connection
between the foreign forum and the cause of action. For instance, in
CIMA Plastics Corp. v. Sandid Enterprises Ltd.,39 the court noted
that there was a real and substantial connection (albeit not a
particularly strong one) between the foreign forum and the defendant
and proceeded to lay out all the relevant connections. 4 0 The only
jurisdictional motions can be used as dilatory tactics to impede
meritorious claims;
8) it is wrong to look to foreign court practice as a model for appropriate
assertion of jurisdiction.
Van Breda Court of Appeal Decision, supra note 12.
36. Ibid.
37. The Ontario Court of Appeal explained at paras. 78-79 that based on the
current jurisprudence, Rules 17.02(h) and 17.02(o) needed to be a carved out
of the category-based presumptions.
38. Ibid. at para. 84.
39. 2011 ONCA 589, 341 D.L.R. (4th) 442, 207 A.C.W.S. (3d) 238 (Ont. C.A.).
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reference to Van Breda in the judgment came when the court noted in
passing that "[t]he core of the real and substantial connection test is
the connection that the plaintiffs claim has to the forum and the
connection of the defendant to the forum, respectively." 4 1 The CIMA
Plastics court did not attempt to apply the Van Breda framework for
jurisdiction simpliciter to jurisdiction for enforcement purposes. 4 2
By contrast, in Sincies Chienentin S.p.A. (Trustee of) v. King,43 the
Ontario Superior Court of Justice did apply, in a fairly rigorous
manner, the jurisdictional real and substantial connection test laid
out by the Court of Appeal in Van Breda. The court in King noted
that, had the case been brought in Ontario, it would fall within Rule
17.02(g) and (h) of the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure. The court
then noted that "[t]he basis of the claim therefore satisfying Rule
17.02, it is presumed that a real and substantial connection exists, and
the first stage of the Charron Estate analysis is complete. This
presumption then frames the second stage of analysis and the onus
falls upon the defendant to demonstrate that a real and substantial
connection does not exist." 44 The court ultimately held that the
40. Ibid. at para. 15. ("The litigation was brought by an Illinois company seeking
redress for interference with the payment of an account receivable purchased
from another Illinois company; the account receivable arose from the
business carried on at least in part in Illinois; and the damages were suffered
in Illinois. The principles of fairness, comity and enforceability all support
the real and substantial connection between the forum and the claim.")
41. Ibid. at para 9 [internal citations omitted].
42. A similar approach was taken in Bank of Mongolia v. Taskin, 2011 ONSC
6083, 285 O.A.C. 263, 2011 CarswellOnt 11725 (Ont. Div. Ct.), affirmed
2012 ONCA 220, 2012 CarswellOnt 3980 (Ont. C.A.), where the plaintiff
sought to have a Florida judgment for over $67 million enforced in Ontario.
Again, the court barely referenced the decision in Van Breda. Instead, the
court laid out the underlying facts in the case and then stated in a rather
conclusory fashion:
In my view, there is sufficient evidence, based on Taskin's own
admissions, coupled with the evidence produced by the Bank (even
discounting the document that Taskin says is a forgery) to find a real and
substantial connection based on his active involvement in transactions he
knew to be fraudulent and his connection to his Florida-based co-
defendant fraudsters. His connection to the transaction and his Florida
co-defendants was not 'fleeting' or 'unimportant'.
Ibid. at para. 33.
43. 2010 ONSC 6453, 195 A.C.W.S. (3d) 681, 2010 CarswellOnt 8996 (Ont.
S.C.J.), affirmed 2012 ONCA 653, 221 A.C.W.S. (3d) 553, 2012 CarswellOnt
12074 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused 2013 CarswellOnt 3405, 2013
CarswellOnt 3404 (S.C.C.).
44. Ibid. at para. 181. The court erred in the application of the Rule 17 categories
to the jurisdictional analysis. The Court of Appeal in Van Breda expressly
excepted Rule 17.02(h) (damage sustained in jurisdiction) as a presumptive
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defendant failed to rebut the presumption of jurisdiction that arose
from the application of the Van Breda presumptive category, noting
the various factual connections that existed between the plaintiff and
the Italian forum. Finally, the court assessed what were previously
known as Muscutt factors 3-8 as "analytic tools" in the jurisdiction
analysis. The court spent a considerable amount of time discussing
"fairness" to the parties in the assumption ofjurisdiction, noting that
"[i]t is not unfair that a professional who operates on a worldwide
basis should be subject to foreign jurisdictions." 4 5 The court also took
46into account issues of comity and reciprocity.
Despite the rare case applying the prevailing jurisdiction
simpliciter framework to the enforcement of judgments, it is clear
that courts have, by and large, adopted two different strands of case
law for the real and substantial connection test - one for jurisdiction
simpliciter and the other for jurisdiction at the enforcement stage.
Rarely have courts applied the same version of the "correlated" real
and substantial connection test. Yet, now, the Supreme Court of
Canada has alluded to the fact that the enforcement inquiry may need
to take into account the newly formulated real and substantial
connection test. Additionally, an appellate court has already applied
the Van Breda framework tojudgment enforcement and declared that
the framework should be used in thejudgment enforcement analysis.
So courts are left with a fundamental question: Should the Van Breda
approach to jurisdiction simpliciter also apply to the enforcement of
foreign judgments? It is to that issue that I now turn.
4. At a Crossroads: Should Courts Apply the Van Breda Real
and Substantial Connection Test to Judgment
Enforcement?
This article argues that courts should not apply the Van Breda
framework for jurisdiction simpliciter in assessing the real and
basis for jurisdiction. However, given that the claim involved a tort
committed in the jurisdiction (negligent misrepresentation), the remainder
of the analysis would have been the same.
45. Ibid. at para. 186.
46. Ibid. at para. 189. ("There is no reason to believe that the Italian judicial
system is not capable and respected, or that it would not have enforced an
extra provincial judgment against an Ontario defendant on the same
jurisdictional basis. No complaint was raised in this regard. Roman law is
one of the longest established systems in the western justice tradition, and in
the modern context it operates within the sophisticated framework of the
European Union. I see no reason why principles of comity and reciprocity
should not be recognized in the circumstances of this particular case and
foreign judgment. No one suggested otherwise.")
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substantial connection test for judgment enforcement purposes.
First, Justice LeBel's reasoning in Van Breda distinguishing between
the constitutional dimension of the real and substantial connection
test and the conflict of laws dimension of the real and substantial
connection test shows why there is no requirement that Van Breda
apply to the assessment of jurisdiction for judgment enforcement
purposes. Second, the complexity of the Van Breda analysis in its
original domain (that ofjurisdiction simpliciter) suggests that courts
should use caution in applying it to judgment enforcement. Third,
there are different goals served by creating a framework for
jurisdiction on the front end (jurisdiction simpliciter) and
jurisdiction on the back end (jurisdiction for judgment enforcement
purposes). While certainty and predictability are important in both
inquiries, they are more important to litigants at the outset of a case
than at the end of a case. Each of these issues is explored in turn.
(1) The Distinction Between the Real and Substantial
Connection Test as a Constitutional Principle and as a
Conflict of Laws Principle
As indicated above, the Supreme Court had repeatedly
emphasized that the real and substantial connection test for
jurisdiction simpliciter is "correlated" with the real and substantial
connection test for judgment enforcement purposes. Prior to the
Supreme Court's decision in Van Breda, it would have been safe to
assume that the correlative nature of the real and substantial
connection test meant that the test would have to apply equally to
both ex ante jurisdiction and jurisdiction for enforcement purposes.
In other words, if the real and substantial connection on the front end
involved assessing (for instance) fairness, efficiency and comity 4 7 as a
jurisdictional prerequisite, then jurisdiction on the back end would
also involve the same considerations. Thus, certain courts - quite
understandably - have taken the prevailing framework and content
of the real and substantial connection test as applied to ex juris
defendants and imported it to the judgment enforcement context. 4 8
However, Justice LeBel's fairly lengthy elucidation of the real and
substantial connection test in Van Breda reveals why, despite the so-
called "correlative" nature of the real and substantial connection test,
it is not necessary that the test look the same both on the front end and
on the back end.
47. As, for instance, under the Muscuu framework. See supra note 11.
48. Most notably, King, supra note 43.
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In Van Breda, Justice LeBel distinguished between the two senses
in which the expression "real and substantial connection test" is used:
first, as a constitutional limit on the assumption of jurisdiction and,
second as a principle ofprivate international law. In thejurisprudence
post-Morguard, courts had used the term "real and substantial
connection" in both senses, leading to "confusion about both the
nature of the test and the constitutional status of the rules and
principles of private international law." 49 Accordingly, Justice LeBel
emphasized the need for a clearer distinction between the
constitutional dimension and private international law dimension
of the real and substantial connection test.
With respect to the former, Justice LeBel explained that from a
constitutional standpoint, the real and substantial connection test
was intended to place limits on both legislativejurisdiction (the power
of a court to apply a particular province's law) and adjudicative
jurisdiction (the power of a court to hear a dispute), these limits
deriving from the text of s. 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.50 With
respect to adjudicative jurisdiction - the live issue in Van Breda -
Justice LeBel emphasized that the constitutional dimension of the
real and substantial connection test is intended to ensure "legitimacy
in the exercise of the state's power of adjudication."5 Accordingly,
the connection between the state and a particular dispute could not be
weak or hypothetical since a "weak or hypothetical connection would
cast doubt upon the legitimacy of the exercise of state power over the
persons affected by the dispute." 52
Justice LeBel stressed that the constitutional dimension of the real
and substantial connection test was "related to, but distinct from, the
real and substantial connection test as expressed in conflicts rules."5 3
Conflicts rules operate within the confines of the constitutional
dimension of the real and substantial connection test and serve to
provide more concrete rules for the assertion of judicial and
legislative jurisdiction. Justice LeBel elaborated: 54
[Tihe real and substantial connection test . . . does not dictate the content of
conflicts rules . .. In its constitutional sense, it places limits on the reach of the
jurisdiction of a province's courts and on the application of provincial laws to
interprovincial or international situations . . . But it does not establish the actual
49. Van Breda, supra note I at para. 22.
50. Constitution Act. 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 6, s. 92.
51. Van Breda, supra note I at para. 32.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid. at para. 33.
54. Ibid. at paras. 23, 33.
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content of rules and principles of private international law, nor does it require that
those rules and principles be uniform.
The constitutional territorial limits . . . are concerned with setting the outer
boundaries within which a variety of appropriate conflicts rules can be elaborated
and applied. The purpose of the constitutional principle is to ensure that specific
conflicts rules remain within these boundaries and, as a result, that they authorize
the assumption of jurisdiction only in circumstances representing a legitimate
exercise of the state's power of adjudication.
The Van Breda framework for jurisdiction simpliciter deals with
the real and substantial connection test in the private international
law/conflict of laws sense - not in the constitutional sense.55
Accordingly, Justice LeBel recognized that there could be a variety
of approaches to the real and substantial connection test, including
the approach that he ultimately adopted, all of which could fit
comfortably within the outer confines of the constitutional test.56
It may be helpful to think of the conflict of laws (or private
international law) dimension of the real and substantial connection
test as being a smaller concentric circle encapsulated within a larger
concentric circle. The inner circle (the conflict of laws real and
substantial connection test) can take on one of a number of
permutations, so long as it remains within the boundaries of the
outer circle (the constitutional real and substantial connection test).
Indeed, if a province so wished, it could provide for judicial
jurisdiction to the maximum extent permitted by the constitutional
dimension of the real and substantial connection test such that, in
effect, there would be just one circle.
55. Justice LeBel explicitly recognized this, noting "[t]his case concerns the
elaboration of the 'real and substantial connection' test as an appropriate
common law conflicts rule for the assumption of jurisdiction." Ibid. at para.
34.
56. See ibid. at para. 34. ("To be clear, however, the existence of a constitutional
test aimed at maintaining the constitutional limits on the powers of a
province's legislature and courts does not mean that the rules of private
international law must be uniform across Canada. Legislatures and courts
may adopt various solutions to meet the constitutional requirements and the
objectives of efficiency and fairness that underlie our private international
law system. Nor does this test's existence mean that the connections with the
province must be the strongest ones possible or that they must all point in the
same direction.")
57. See, e.g., ibid. at para. 30. ("One approach is to view the test not only as a
constitutional principle, but also as a conflicts rule in itself. If it is viewed as a












The real and substantial connection test that the Supreme Court
has repeatedly emphasized as being "correlated" (i.e., equally
applicable in the jurisdiction simpliciter and judgment enforcement
context) is the constitutional dimension of the real and substantial
connection test. Thus, so long as a provincial court assumes
jurisdiction in a constitutionally restrained manner, consistent with
the constitutional dimension of the real and substantial connection
test, an enforcing court is obligated to give the resultantjudgment full
faith and credit (to use an expression borrowed from American
law).5 Since it is not the conflict of laws dimension of the real and
substantial connection test which is "correlated" for jurisdiction
by the courts in decisions in which they would attempt to implement the
objectives of order and fairness in the legal system.")
58. This constitutional imperative only applies inter-provincially. For instance, if
a court in Alberta assumes jurisdiction in a manner consistent with the real
and substantial connection test and issues a money judgment, a court in
Ontario will be obligated to give effect to the resultant judgment. However,
there is obviously no constitutional obligation to do so where the judgment
emanates from a truly foreign jurisdiction (e.g., the United States), although
courts have, as a matter of comity, extended domestic judgment enforcement
principles to truly foreign judgments. See generally Beals, supra note 8.
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simpliciter and jurisdiction enforcement purposes, there is no
obligation for the real and substantial connection test used in the
enforcement context to replicate that used in the ex ante jurisdiction
context. Otherwise stated, there is no reason why courts would need
to apply the new Van Breda framework forjurisdiction -presumptive
connecting factors and all - to the issue of judgment enforcement.
And indeed, there are compelling reasons why courts should not.
These reasons are explored in detail below.
(2) The Complexity of the Current Jurisdictional Analysis
Commentators, including myself, have lamented the complexity of
the jurisdiction simpliciter analysis for many years. In the Muscuit
era, the critiques tended to focus on the theme that jurisdictional
determinations were too subjective and unduly influenced by
considerations of fairness; accordingly, it was difficult to predict
with certainty whether a court had jurisdiction. Responding to these
concerns, the Supreme Court in Van Breda re-oriented the
jurisdictional test to focus on objective connections between the
forum and the cause of action as being the touchstone of the
jurisdictional analysis. However, in attempting to give additional
structure to this area of law, it may be that the Supreme Court of
Canada made jurisdictional determinations a little too structured,
leading to a whole new set of problems.
There have been various critiques leveled at the Court's judgment
in Van Breda: the framework set up in Van Breda is too rigid and does
not account for cases where there is a legitimate connection between
the dispute and the cause of action, but that connection falls short of
satisfying a presumptive connecting factor; the framework is too tort-
focused; certain presumptive connecting factors leave a fair amount
of interpretative wiggle-room; the factor a "contract connected to the
dispute was made in [thejurisdiction]" is of dubious provenance and
utility; the presumptive connecting factors are, in effect, irrebuttable;
the Court made no attempt to reconcile the traditional grounds of
jurisdiction with the real and substantial connection test; and the
Court failed to explain whether the forum of necessity doctrine was
part of Canadian law. 59 As is clear, there is no shortage of critiques
aimed at the new Van Breda framework for jurisdiction.
59. For a discussion of the Van Breda case, including many of these critiques, see
Vaughan Black, op. cit note 20; Joost Blom, op. cit. note 4; Brandon Kain,
Elder C. Marques, and Byron Shaw, "Developments in Private International
Law: The 2011-2012 Term - The Unfinished Project of the Van Breda
Trilogy" (2012), 59 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 277; Tanya Monestier, op. cit. note
22.
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Certain of these critiques are magnified in the judgment
enforcement context, suggesting that it would be particularly
inappropriate to import the Van Breda framework to the judgment
enforcement inquiry. For instance, one of the most significant
shortcomingsof Van Breda- if not the most significant shortcoming-
is that the Court's judgment was so tort-specific that it failed to
provide meaningful guidance on how to deal with the myriad of
claims that are not tort-based. How are courts to approach cases
involving breach of contract? Family law? Property law? Are courts
supposed to craft a Van Breda-like framework in other substantive
areas of law, complete with presumptive connecting factors? Or, are
all non-tort cases supposed to use a more traditional fact-based real
and substantial connection test? It is clear from the case law post- Van
Breda that courts are attempting to shoehorn all cases into the Van
Breda paradigm, even where it is an awkward fit.6 0 How does all this
uncertainty play out in the judgment enforcement context?
Assume, for instance, that the plaintiff in a foreign action asserted
multiple causes of action (including a tort claim). The tort claim,
however, was dismissed and the action proceeded to judgment on
another basis. How is an enforcing court to characterize that claim for
jurisdictional purposes? 61 Does the enforcing court accept that the
tort claim was dismissed and therefore not apply the Van Breda tort
factors? Does the enforcing court apply some variant of Van Breda,
depending on what claim the foreign court accepted? Or, does the
enforcing court pretend the action was not litigated and assess
jurisdiction as though it were the judgment court (e.g., based on the
pleadings, to include the tort claim)?
Questions also abound when looking at the specific presumptive
connecting factors themselves. As mentioned, several of the
presumptive connecting factors have a fair bit of flexibility built
into them. In particular, "the defendant carries on business in the
jurisdiction," "a tort was committed in the jurisdiction" and "a
60. For example, in Wang v. Lin 2012 ONSC 3374, 215 A.C.W.S. (3d) 640, 2012
CarswellOnt 7211 (Ont. S.C.J.), reversed in part 2013 ONCA 33, 358 D.L.R.
(4th) 452, 29 R.F.L. (7th) I (Ont. C.A.), the court indicated that it was
applying the Van Breda framework to claims arising under the Family Law
Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3. However, the presumptive factors were an awkward
fit and the court ended up focusing instead of matters which were relevant in
the family law context (e.g., where the parties were married, where the
children were born), all while claiming that it was applying Van Breda.
61. Kain et al. note the inherent difficulty of characterizing a claim ex ante:
"Given that such motions generally arise at the pleadings stage, however, the
'essence' of the claim will generally be very difficult for motion judges to
assess." Op. cit. note 59 at 288.
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contract connected with the dispute was made in thejurisdiction" are
all subject to interpretation. How exactly does an enforcing court go
about assessing this on the back end? When a plaintiff is asking a
Canadian court to assume jurisdiction over an ex juris defendant, it
will introduce evidence on the presumptive factors it believes apply
(and the defendant will seek to rebut these factors). In a foreign court,
which is assuming jurisdiction under its own (i.e., foreign) rules of
jurisdiction, evidence pertaining to carrying on business, related
contracts, or where the tort was committed may or may not be
introduced. So, how does an enforcing court go about getting the
information expost that would validate jurisdiction for enforcement
purposes under Canadian rules of jurisdiction? For instance, if the
foreign court made no mention of a related contract but there was, in
fact, some related contract that was entered into in the foreign
jurisdiction, is this something that the enforcing court can consider?
The point is that it is unclear how to apply a framework that was
designed to be applied ex ante to the ex post enforcement inquiry. 62
One might question whether the aforementioned concerns with the
application of the revised Van Breda approach to jurisdiction are
more hypothetical than real. In other words, is the test really going to
be that difficult to apply? The case of Hartzog v. McGriskin6 3
illustrates that the answer to this question is yes. In Hartzog, the
plaintiff sought to enforce a default Tennesseejudgment for over $1.7
million (along with certain injunctive relief) in Ontario. Hartzog
involved a claim by a conservator of the person and property of Eileen
McClintock, a resident of Tennessee, against Norah McGriskin, a
resident of Ontario. According to the skeletal facts laid out in the
judgment, Ms. McClintock and Ms. McGriskin became friends after
bonding over a shared hobby; eventually, the health of the former
declined and the latter undertook to make arrangements to care for
her in Ontario. The conservator for Ms. McClintock transferred over
$1 million in funds from her accounts in Tennessee to Ms. McGriskin
in Ontario. Ms. McGriskin apparently used the funds for the
purchase and renovation of a property in Ontario. The allegation
appeared to be that Ms. McGriskin misappropriated the plaintiffs
funds and should be liable to remit them to Ms. McClintock, along
with attorney's fees, interest, and the like.
62. Additionally, it is unclear how courts would apply a Van Breda-infused
Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act (CiPTA) approach to
jurisdiction simpliciter. In other words, in those jurisdictions that have
adopted the CJPTA (as modified by the Supreme Court in Van Breda), how
would this framework apply to judgment enforcement?
63. 2010 ONSC 5618, 16 C.P.C. (7th) 299. 195 A.C.W.S. (3d) 992 (Ont. S.C.J.).
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How would the Van Breda framework apply in this case? First, is
this even a tort action? It appears to involve claims for restitution ("[a]
constructive trust for the benefit of Eileen B. McClintock over any
and all ill-gotten gains") 64 and injunctive relief. How does a court
even go about categorizing the case? Is a court to look at the
underlying pleadings? The issues that were ultimately resolved in the
plaintiffs favor? It is clear that the Van Breda framework - which is
focused on traditional torts such as negligence and defamation -is an
awkward fit with the multitude of cases that straddle the boundaries
of a variety of different areas of law. This is particularly so
considering that the inquiry involves an enforcing court
categorizing a case that has been brought and already decided in
another court.
Hartzog also illustrates that the application of the Van Breda
framework for jurisdiction to judgment enforcement will result in
fewer judgments actually being enforced in Canada. Assuming that
the Van Breda framework could somehow apply in Hartzog, it is not
clear that the foreign court had jurisdiction under this framework.
The court summed up the reasons why it believed that there was a real
and substantial connection between the foreign forum and the
* 65action:
Ms. McClintock has resided in Tennessee since August 2007. She gave a power
of attorney to Mr. Hogan, a wealth advisor in Tennessee. Mr. Hogan transferred
Ms. McClintock's funds to Ms. McGriskin from three financial institutions
located in Tennessee. Finally, Ms. McClintock has suffered damages in
Tennessee in that her assets that were in Tennessee financial institutions have
been misappropriated. In my view, the Tennessee court has a real and substantial
connection with the subject matter of the Tennessee action.
All of these appear to be irrelevant considerations under the Van
Breda framework. The fact that the plaintiff resided in Tennessee or
suffered damage in Tennessee is irrelevant as Justice LeBel
emphasized that "[t]he use of damage sustained as a connecting
factor may raise difficult issues . . . As a result, presumptive effect
cannot be accorded to this connecting factor."6 The fact that Ms.
McClintock gave a power of attorney to her conservator in Tennessee
or that the money was transferred from banks in Tennessee is equally
irrelevant under the prevailing approach. One would be hard-pressed
to find any presumptive connecting factors based on the facts
outlined in the judgment. The defendant was not domiciled or
64. Ibid. at para. 2.
65. Ibid. at para. 25.
66. Van Breda, supra note I at para. 89.
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resident in Tennessee; she did not carry on business there; and there
was no contract connected to the dispute that was entered into in
Tennessee. The only presumptive factor that could conceivably apply
is that a tort was committed in Tennessee. Provided that the action
could properly be characterized as a tort action, a court would need to
determine where the tort was committed - where the funds were
initially located, or where the funds were transferred. It is likely that
the tort in this scenario (some species of fraud, conversion or
misappropriation) would be deemed to have occurred where the
funds were converted to the defendant's own use (i.e., Ontario). It is
likely, under what is known about the facts of Hartzog, that there
would not be a real and substantial connection under the Van Breda
framework for jurisdiction.
The point here is twofold: first, to illustrate that applying the Van
Breda framework forjurisdiction to the enforcement ofjudgments is
a complicated endeavour, particularly as it concerns the
categorization of a dispute that was already heard in a different
forum; and second, to demonstrate that the selection of the
jurisdictional test is not just a matter of semantics, but can have a
very real impact in real cases.
The simplest and most straightforward approach is not to import
Van Breda into the judgment enforcement framework, but rather to
rely on a fact-based real and substantial connection test, while
heeding the Supreme Court's guidance that the emphasis needs to be
on objective factual connections between the dispute and the cause of
action. Many courts have already been doing this - including the
court in Hartzog itself. The only caveat is that these courts need to
implement the test in a way that accords with the general principles
laid out in Van Breda regarding the constitutional underpinnings of
the real and substantial connection test.
(3) The Different Goals Served By Jurisdiction Simpliciter
and Jurisdiction for Enforcement Purposes
In Van Breda, Justice LeBel emphasized the need to craft conflicts
rules for jurisdiction that were clear, definitive and predictable. That
way, litigants knew where they stood going into the litigation. In this
respect, he stated:6 7
Parties must be able to predict with reasonable confidence whether a court will
assume jurisdiction in a case with an international or interprovincial aspect. The
need for certainty and predictability may conflict with the objective of fairness.
67. Ibid. at para. 73.
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An unfair set of rules could hardly be considered an efficient and just legal
regime. The challenge is to reconcile fairness with the need for security, stability
and efficiency in the design and implementation of a conflict of laws system.
The Supreme Court responded to this challenge of reconciling
order and fairness by crafting a set of connecting factors - based on
objective facts- which would presumptively entitle a court to assume
jurisdiction, while at the same time allow for a defendant to rebut the
presumption. To the extent that order and fairness conflicted, the
Court in Van Breda expressed a preference for order, noting that
while "[flairness and justice are necessary characteristics of a legal
system . . . they cannot be divorced from the requirements of
predictability and stability which assure order in the conflicts
system."68
The Supreme Court in Van Breda was correct in emphasizing the
importance of predictability and certainty in the area ofjurisdiction.
Parties should be able to predict at the outset of a case, with some
degree of certainty, whether a given court will havejurisdiction over a
dispute. Under the approach which prevailed under Muscutt (and to a
lesser extent, the Court of Appeal's decision in Van Breda), there was
no way to predict what thejurisdictional result would be. Since courts
considered purely subjective factors which were entirely unique to the
litigation (such as the resources of the parties before the court, and the
approach to jurisdiction and enforcement ofjudgments prevailing in
the defendant's home state), there was little ability to "read the tea
leaves" and make an informed decision on jurisdiction. This meant
that many years and many dollars were wasted in skirmishes related
to jurisdiction. The Van Breda case itself is a perfect illustration of
this: a total of nine years elapsed before a final decision was made on
whether the Ontario court had jurisdiction. Where there are clear and
well-defined rules of the game, all parties can order their affairs
accordingly.
There is less of a need, however, for certain and predictable rules
related to jurisdiction for enforcement purposes. In other words, it is
not as important that the real and substantial connection test on the
back end be as well-defined and precise as the real and substantial
connection test on the front end. As stated by Professor Black,
"[a]rguably the value of simplicity, so central to Club Resort's mission
to reduce pre-trial motions on jurisdiction, is less salient when it
comes to enforcement of foreign judgments. ",69
68. Ibid. at para. 74.
69. Black, op. cit. note 20 at 440.
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It is important to consider the context in which the real and
substantial connection test is likely to be a factor in the enforcement
analysis. In cases where the defendant attorned to the jurisdiction of
the foreign court or was served with process while present in the
foreign jurisdiction, there is no need to resort to the real and
substantial connection test. In these contexts, "presence" and
"consent" suffice to form the basis for the foreign court's
jurisdiction. It is only where the defendant has not participated in
the foreign proceedings-and thejudgment has proceeded by default
- that the real and substantial connection test is relevant. In such
cases, the defendant has already taken a serious risk that the foreign
court might render a judgment that is enforceable somewhere else,
wherever the defendant's assets happen to be located at the time of the
judgment. Granted, if the rules for jurisdiction on the back end were
structured in a Van Breda-like manner (i.e., with presumptive
connecting factors), it might be marginally easier for the defendant
to determine whether or not a given Canadian court would regard the
foreign court as jurisdictionally competent. This may have some
effect on a defendant's decision to litigate or not litigate the claim in
the foreign jurisdiction. However, it would not eliminate the
uncertainty altogether. Given the amenability of some of the
presumptive connecting factors to creative argumentation (e.g.,
where the tort occurred; whether there is a contract connected with
the dispute that was entered into in the foreign forum), a Canadian
court might still find that a foreign court hasjurisdiction by finessing
and manipulating the factors. Or, a court might create new
presumptive connecting factors. Or, a court might characterize the
case as something other than tort and apply a wholly different
framework to the jurisdiction inquiry. The point is that a defendant
resisting enforcement under the Van Breda framework would benefit
from some additional certainty - but only marginally so. 70
The situation is similar for a plaintiff bringing suit in a foreign
jurisdiction, but eventually seeking execution against the defendant's
assets elsewhere. By bringing an action in a jurisdiction where the
defendant does not have assets and where the defendant has chosen
not to defend, the plaintiff already bears a risk that it will be left with
70. Importantly, the plaintiff seeking enforcement in Canada may face other
obstacles aside from jurisdiction. The defendant may raise one of a number
of impeachment defences (fraud, natural justice, public policy) or other
arguments (e.g., lack of finality) to argue that the judgment should not be
enforced. Thus, even if the real and substantial connection test were
incredibly predictable, judgment creditors are still facing several unknowns
at the judgment enforcement stage of the analysis.
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nothing but a paper judgment. The plaintiff does not know exactly
where the defendant's assets will be after the litigation has run its
course (though it may have some sense based on where the defendant
is resident or domiciled). It cannot be assured that the defendant will
not move all its assets to ajurisdiction where they are out of the reach
of the plaintiff. Accordingly, at best, the plaintiff can make the
calculus at the outset of litigation in the foreign court that if there is a
judgment in its favour, thejudgment will likely be enforceable where
the plaintiff believes the defendant's assets will eventually be located.
Again, the Van Breda framework (as opposed to a pure objective-
based real and substantial connection test) makes the analysis only
marginally more predictable- and likely not enough to influence the
decision to pursue litigation in the first place.
There is certainly benefit to litigants in having jurisdictional rules
which are well-defined, precise, certain and predictable at the
enforcement stage of the inquiry. These rules could help litigants
determine whether to pursue a claim in the first place, or whether to
defend a claim in a foreign jurisdiction. However, the new Van Breda
framework for jurisdiction will likely not produce sufficient benefits
to overcome its shortcomings when it is applied to jurisdiction for
enforcement purposes - and in particular, its clunkiness as a tool for
assessing whether a foreign court that has issued a judgment had
jurisdiction over a defendant.
5. What Should the Jurisdictional Inquiry at the Enforcement
Stage Look Like?
Above, I argued that there is no obligation that courts apply the
framework adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Van Breda to
the judgment enforcement inquiry, and indeed that it would be
unduly complicated to do so. In this section, I address some of the
issues raised by not adopting a correlative jurisdictional test to the
enforcement of foreign judgments.
(1) Restrained Jurisdiction, Expansive Enforcement
The most obvious problem that results from not applying the Van
Bredaj urisdiction approach to the enforcement of foreign judgments
is that it causes a strange disconnect between the treatment accorded
to Canadian plaintiffs in domestic actions and that accorded to
Canadian defendants in foreign actions. Under the Van Breda
approach to the real and substantial connection test, jurisdiction
simpliciter is now more restrained. Plaintiffs must fit themselves
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within one of four well-defined categories; if they cannot, then a
Canadian court cannot hear the case. This is true even if there are
objective factual connections between the dispute and the cause of
action. If those connections cannot be translated into a presumptive
connecting factor (either listed or new), then those plaintiffs are out of
luck. It is thought that the rigidity of the framework forjurisdiction is
an acceptable trade-off for the increased certainty that plaintiffs now
have going into jurisdictional determinations. But the fact remains
that Van Breda makes it harder for plaintiffs to convince a Canadian
court to hear their case. By contrast, if one were to apply a pure
connection-based real and substantial connection test to the
judgment enforcement inquiry (rather than the Van Breda
jurisdictional framework), foreign creditors seeking enforcement
against Canadian defendants would benefit from a "better"
jurisdictional standard. These foreign creditors could argue that,
based on an amalgam of factors, there is a real and substantial
connection between the foreign court and the cause of action. And in
most judgment enforcement actions, Canadian courts have seemed
all too happy to compile connections and conclude that they are "real
and substantial." The point is that foreign judgment creditors seeking
execution against Canadian debtors can combine various objective
connections to get to the requisite "real and substantial connection"
required for enforcement, while Canadian plaintiffs seeking to sue
foreign defendants cannot. Consider the following examples:
Example One: Canadian plaintiff crosses over the Canada-
U.S. border to go shopping at a Big Box store in the
United States. Canadian plaintiff slips and falls and
subsequently endures pain and suffering in Canada.
Canadian plaintiff sues American defendant in Ontario.
An Ontario court will not have jurisdiction over the
American defendant.
Example Two: The situation is reversed. American
defendant crosses over the Canada-U.S. border to go
shopping at a Big Box store in Canada. American
defendant slips and falls and subsequently endures pain
and suffering in the United States. American plaintiff sues
Canadian defendant in the U.S. It may be that an
American court assumes jurisdiction over the dispute
(say, because the Canadian store advertised and "purpo-
sely availed" itself of the American forum).
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In the event that the American court in Example Two issues a
money judgment against the Canadian plaintiff: a) the judgment
would not be enforceable under the Van Breda framework; and b) the
judgment may be enforceable under a pure connection-based
framework. This would mean that Canadian courts would be more
liberal in enforcing judgments against Canadian defendants than
they would be in providing a forum for Canadian plaintiffs to seek
redress. Intuitively this does not seem fair. Why would we limit the
power of Canadian courts to hear disputes (through the adoption of
the Van Breda framework) and not equally constrain the power of
Canadian courts to enforce foreign judgments against domestic
defendants? The point is a good one- but I submit that the answer to
this problem lies not in importing the Van Breda framework and all its
attendant complexity to thejudgment enforcement arena, but rather
in revisiting the degree of connection required to establish the real and
substantial connection test in truly foreign cases and by fine-tuning
the impeachment defences. Below, I separately address the
application of the real and substantial connection test in the inter-
provincial context and in the international context.
(2) The Real and Substantial Connection Test Applied to
Judgments from Other Canadian Provinces
Canadian courts should not apply the Van Breda framework for
jurisdiction to the assessment of whether another provincial court
properly asserted jurisdiction for the purposes of enforcing a sister
province's judgment. Morguard held that a province must give full
faith and credit to a judgment of another provincial court that
assumed jurisdiction on the basis of presence, consent or real and
substantial connection. Importantly, Justice LeBel's clarification in
Van Breda is imperative here - the real and substantial connection
that compels enforcement is the constitutional real and substantial
connection, not the conflict oflaws real and substantial connection. In
other words, so long as a provincial court assumes jurisdiction in a
way that does not exceed the outermost limits of the constitutional
dimension of the real and substantial connection test (the larger
concentric circle in the diagram at Part 4, above), then other
provincial courts are obligated to give effect to that judgment.
For instance, assume that a court in British Columbia does not
adopt the Van Breda approach wholesale (in part because of the
existence of the Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act 7 in
force in that province), which means that it assumes jurisdiction and
71. S.B.C. 2003, c. 28.
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renders a judgment based on connections that do not fit within the
Van Breda presumptive factors. Nonetheless, these factors are
collectively significant enough that they do not run afoul of the
constitutional dimension of the real and substantial connection test.
Conceptually, the British Columbia court has assumed jurisdiction
based on facts which operate in the "gap" between the inner
concentric circle (the Van Breda conflicts rules) and the outer
concentric circle (the constitutional dimension of the real and
substantial connection test). An Ontario court would be compelled to
enforce such a judgment, even though an application of the Van
Breda test to jurisdiction would suggest otherwise. This is because
Morguard and its progeny mandate that a provincial court enforce
the judgment of a sister province that has appropriately assumed
jurisdiction - not that has assumed jurisdiction in the way that the
enforcing court would have. 72
Justice LeBel in Van Breda left open the possibility that the
conflicts rules would differ from province to province. In fact, he
mentioned this on several occasions. At one point in thejudgment, he
stated: 73
To be clear, however, the existence of a constitutional test aimed at maintaining
the constitutional limits on the powers of a province's legislature and courts does
not mean that the rules of private international law must be uniform across
Canada. Legislatures and courts may adopt various solutions to meet the
constitutional requirements and the objectives of efficiency and fairness that
underlie our private international law system. Nor does this test's existence mean
72. This point is underscored by looking at enforcement legislation. Under the
Uniform Enforcement of Canadian Judgments and Decrees Act (2005), a
model law which is intended to apply to the enforcement of judgments from
other provinces, a party may not challenge the jurisdiction of the rendering
court at the enforcement stage of the proceedings. See s. 6(3)(a): "Notwith-
standing subsection (2), the [superior court of unlimited trial jurisdiction in
the enacting province or territory] shall not make an order staying or limiting
the enforcement of a registered Canadian judgment solely on the grounds
that . . . the judge, court or tribunal that made the judgment lacked
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the proceeding that led to the
judgment, or over the party against whom enforcement is sought." In the
Comments to this section, the Drafters state that "[t]his provision gives
specific effect to the full faith and credit policy of UECJDA . . . The proper
course of a judgment debtor who alleges that the judgment is flawed is to
seek relief in the place where the judgment was made." See Comment, online:
Uniform Conference of Canada <www.ulcc.ca/en/uniform-acts-en-gb-1/
333-enforcement-of-canadian-judgments-decrees-act/4-enforcement-of-cana-
dian-judgments-and-decrees-act>.
73. Van Breda, supra note I at para. 34.
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that the connections with the province must be the strongest ones possible or that
they must all point in the same direction.
He repeated this idea again later in the judgment: 74
Because the provinces have been assigned constitutional jurisdiction over such
matters, they are free to develop different solutions and approaches, provided that
they abide by the territorial limits of the authority of their legislatures and their
courts.
The difference in permissible approaches tojurisdiction simpliciter
creates the very real possibility that some courts will interpret
jurisdiction more expansively than other courts (so long as they
respect the constitutional dimension of the real and substantial
connection test). These provincial courts are entitled to have their
judgments enforced in other Canadian provinces under Mor uard's
mandate (later constitutionalized in Hunt v. T & N plc) that
Canadian judgments will be recognized and enforced in sister
provinces so long as the originating court had a real and
substantial connection with the dispute.
Accordingly, it would be inappropriate to apply a particular
provincial framework for the assessment of jurisdiction to a dispute
in a way that did not consider the outermost reach of the real and
substantial connection test. As long as the judgment court had the
minimal level of connection constitutionally required, an enforcing
court must enforce the judgment - even if it would not have assumed
jurisdiction over the case itself under similar circumstances.
(3) The Real and Substantial Connection Test Applied to
Truly Foreign Judgments
Unlike the inter-provincial context, it is obviously not a
"constitutional imperative" 76 that Canadian courts give full faith
and credit to judgments from outside the country. Indeed, Canadian
courts could, if they wished, not enforce any foreign judgments. Or
they could, as was the state of affairs pre-Morguard, only enforce
foreign judgments where the underlying basis of jurisdiction in the
judgment forum was presence or consent. 77 For a variety of reasons-
not the least of which is comity - Canadian courts have not chosen to
adopt such a restrictive view of foreign judgments. That does not
mean, however, that Canadian courts must treat foreignjudgments in
74. Ibid. at para. 71.
75. [1993] 4 S.C.R. 289, 109 D.L.R. (4th) 16, 21 C.P.C. (3d) 269 (S.C.C.).
76. Ibid. at 324.
77. Indeed, this is the approach that continues to prevail in England to this day.
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the exact same way they treat provincial judgments. And indeed,
there are compelling reasons not to do so.
I have previously argued (in the context of analyzing the Beals
decision) that there should be a distinction drawn between enforcing
Canadian judgments and enforcing foreign judgments. I reproduce
that argument, in part, below:78
[TJhe Supreme Court's uncritical extension of the Morguard rules to the
international context fails to appreciate that domestic enforcement imperatives
differ appreciably from international ones. LeBel J., in his powerful dissenting
opinion in Beals, underscored the fact that "the considerations informing the
application of the test to foreign-country judgments are not identical to those that
shape conflict rules within Canada." Indeed, it must be recalled that in
Morguard, LaForest J. grounded his analysis in uniquely Canadian realities . . .
Th[e] federalism stream of reasoning permeating the Morguard decision
obviously has no application in the international judgment enforcement arena.
The Court in Morguard also made reference to the fact that concerns about the
quality of justice in the inter-provincial sphere could have "no real foundation"
and that "fair process is not an issue within the Canadian federation." We cannot
make the same presumptions in the international context. To date, most of the
foreign judgments that Canadian courts have been called upon to enforce using
the Morguard analysis have been issued by American and English courts. If
"foreign" is conceived in terms of these jurisdictions (and possibly a few others)
the extension of Morguard principles to foreign judgments would likely cause
little trepidation. However, at the risk of pointing out the obvious, foreign means
foreign - the test, in theory, would apply equally and indiscriminately to
judgments from the U.S., Ghana, Uzbekistan, Romania and Burkina Faso ...
Aside from the issue of how fair the foreign legal system may be, the real and
substantial connection test ignores the question of how fair it is to require a
Canadian defendant to litigate in a foreign forum ... Once a real and substantial
connection with either New York or Nepal has been made out, a Canadian
defendant is expected to defend his claim in the foreign jurisdiction - irrespective
of where that jurisdiction is, how difficult it is to access, and how unfamiliar the
legal terrain may be - or risk the possibility that an enforceable default judgment
will be issued against him.
While I am of the view that Canadian courts should not be quite so
generous in enforcing foreign judgments, I do not believe the solution
lies in applying the Van Breda presumptive connecting factors test to
assess whether the foreign court properly assumed jurisdiction over
the dispute. For the reasons discussed above, the Van Breda test is an
unwieldy tool to assess whether the judgment court should be
78. Tanya J. Monestier, "Foreign Judgments at Common Law: Rethinking the
Enforcement Rules" (2005), 28 Dal. L.J. 163 at 179-81 [internal citations
omitted].
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recognized as jurisdictionally competent. There are various other
ways that this could be accomplished instead. A Canadian court
could require a specific connection between the defendant and the
foreign court as a predicate to recognizing the foreign court's
jurisdictional competence. Or, as suggested by Justice LeBel himself
in his dissenting opinion in Beals, a Canadian court could tailor the
real and substantial connection analysis to require "a connection ...
strong enough to make it reasonable for the defendant to be expected
to litigate there even though that may entail additional expense,
inconvenience and risk." 79 In other words, Canadian courts could
adopt a real and substantial connection test "plus" for foreign
defendants. Either of these solutions would be preferable to applying
the Van Breda test, with all its flaws, to the enforcement inquiry.
Moreover, the real and substantial connection test is only part of
the enforcement puzzle. If Canadian courts were to adopt a policy of
restraint in the enforcement of foreign judgments, they would need to
examine principles related to the legitimacy of "presence" as a
jurisdictional prerequisite as well as the defences to enforcement. The
real and substantial connection test, in other words, is only a piece of a
larger framework for the enforcement of foreign judgments. To the
extent that the enforcement of foreignjudgmentsis to reflectconcerns
related to comity, international relations, politics, economics, or the
like, the framework should be thought out in a more holistic way. The
79. Beals, supra note 8 at para. 183, LeBel J., dissenting. The modified test is best
explained in Justice LeBel's words in Beals, at paras. 182-83:
The test should ensure that, considering the totality of the connections
between the forum and all aspects of the action, it is not unfair to expect
the defendant to litigate in that forum. It does not follow that there
necessarily has to be a connection between the defendant and the forum.
There are situations where, given the other connections between the forum
and the proceeding, it is a reasonable place for the action to be heard and
the defendant can fairly be expected to go there even though he personally
has no link at all to that jurisdiction . . . [W]hen a court is asked to
recognize and enforce a foreign judgment, and questions whether the
originating court's jurisdiction was properly restrained, it should inquire
into the connections between the forum and all aspects of the action, on
the one hand, and the hardship that litigation in the foreign forum would
impose on the defendant, on the other. The question is how real and how
substantial a connection has to be to support the conclusion that the
originating court was a reasonable place for the action to be heard. The
answer is that the connection must be strong enough to make it reasonable
for the defendant to be expected to litigate there even though that may entail
additional expense, inconvenience and risk. If litigating in the foreign
jurisdiction is very burdensome to the defendant, a stronger degree of
connection would be required before the originating court 's assumption of
jurisdiction should be recognized as fair and appropriate. [Emphasis added.]
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point of this section is not to definitively endorse the adoption of one
particular approach or another to the enforcement of truly foreign
judgments, but simply to recognize that any revision in this area of
law should be deliberate, comprehensive, and well-reasoned.
6. Conclusion
Courts have only just begun sorting out the contours of the
Supreme Court of Canada's new approach to jurisdiction. One issue
that courts will soon confront is whether the Van Breda framework
can or does apply outside of the particular context in which it was
developed. Justice LeBel in Van Breda itself indicated that the
decision could have a ripple effect in other areas of the conflict of laws,
and in particular, in the judgment enforcement inquiry. Although
seemingly logical to apply the same common law real and substantial
connection test both to jurisdiction simpliciler and to jurisdiction for
enforcement purposes, this article suggests that courts refrain from
doing so. Although the real and substantial connection test for
jurisdiction simpliciter is "correlated" with the real and substantial
connection test for assessing a foreign court's jurisdictional
competence for judgment enforcement purposes, it is important to
recognize that it is the constitutional dimension of the test that is
correlated. In other words, there is nothing that mandates applying
the same conflict of laws/common law framework for jurisdiction
simpliciter to the enforcement of foreign judgments.
Moreover, the Van Breda framework itself has many kinks to be
worked out, including the issue of how the presumptive factors are to
be interpreted and how the framework applies in non-tort cases.
These concerns become magnified when applied to the issue of
assessing a foreign court'sjurisdictional competence at thejudgment
enforcement stage of the inquiry. Further, although there is always a
desire for certainty and predictability in this area of law, it is arguably
less important that there be definitive jurisdictional rules at the
judgment enforcement stage than at thejurisdiction simpliciter stage
of the analysis. As cogently stated by Professor Black:
... tt]he attendant loss of nuance and subtlety in the R&SC [real and substantial
connection] inquiry brought about by [ Van Bredaj, while an acceptable cost to
pay for the elimination of dilatory pre-trial squabbling on questions of court
jurisdiction, may render that standard an overly blunt tool when it comes to
addressing some other areas in which it has come to function.
80. Black, op. cit. note 20 at 440.
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Accordingly, courts should not export the Van Breda framework
into thejudgment enforcement realm. To the extent that it is felt that a
connection-based real and substantial connection test is too broad,
particularly in comparison to a more restrained jurisdiction
simpliciter approach, it is suggested that courts - or preferably
legislatures - address this issue in a more comprehensive, fulsome
way. The solution to a perceived disconnect between the treatment of
Canadian plaintiffs and Canadian judgment debtors is not resolved
simply by applying the same jurisdictional test on both the front and
back end. Rather, the solution lies in closely examining the rules for
the enforcement of foreign judgments, including all existing
jurisdictional bases as well as impeachment defences, and deciding
what these rules should look like.
